Trust, but verify
Uncover shadow access paths, ghost admins, and surface what needs attention.. continuously.
They don't break in. They login.
Ghost admins
The contractor who left 8 months ago still has admin access to three production systems. Nobody noticed. No alert fired.
Ownerless service accounts
You have 4× more service accounts, API keys, and OAuth apps than human employees. Most have no owner. Some have admin.
No audit trail
When you investigate who could read customer data last Tuesday at 3am, you'll have no answer. Your SIEM won't either.
of breaches used valid credentials
— Verizon DBIR 2024
avg. detection time for an identity breach
— IBM Cost of a Breach 2024
to walk in with a leaked token
The feed never stops. Yours is in it.
Every one of these started with a credential, not a CVE. No malware. No CVE. They just logged in.
An employee's OAuth grant to a third-party AI tool gave attackers a two-month path into production secrets. Source code and API tokens were exfiltrated and later listed for sale.
An Iran-linked group gained access to Active Directory and used Microsoft Intune to push wiper payloads to managed endpoints. Manufacturing operations were disrupted for days.
A stolen service account credential gave attackers access to Okta's customer support system. Session tokens for downstream customers were taken in turn.
Long-lived credentials harvested by infostealers were used against accounts that did not enforce multi-factor authentication.
Malware on an engineer's laptop captured a valid session token with broad access. Every secret stored by every customer had to be rotated.
A senior engineer's home device was compromised, providing access to a development environment where master encryption keys could be retrieved.
An employee's OAuth grant to a third-party AI tool gave attackers a two-month path into production secrets. Source code and API tokens were exfiltrated and later listed for sale.
An Iran-linked group gained access to Active Directory and used Microsoft Intune to push wiper payloads to managed endpoints. Manufacturing operations were disrupted for days.
A stolen service account credential gave attackers access to Okta's customer support system. Session tokens for downstream customers were taken in turn.
Long-lived credentials harvested by infostealers were used against accounts that did not enforce multi-factor authentication.
Malware on an engineer's laptop captured a valid session token with broad access. Every secret stored by every customer had to be rotated.
A senior engineer's home device was compromised, providing access to a development environment where master encryption keys could be retrieved.
An employee's OAuth grant to a third-party AI tool gave attackers a two-month path into production secrets. Source code and API tokens were exfiltrated and later listed for sale.
An Iran-linked group gained access to Active Directory and used Microsoft Intune to push wiper payloads to managed endpoints. Manufacturing operations were disrupted for days.
A stolen service account credential gave attackers access to Okta's customer support system. Session tokens for downstream customers were taken in turn.
Long-lived credentials harvested by infostealers were used against accounts that did not enforce multi-factor authentication.
Malware on an engineer's laptop captured a valid session token with broad access. Every secret stored by every customer had to be rotated.
A senior engineer's home device was compromised, providing access to a development environment where master encryption keys could be retrieved.
Attackers used valid OAuth tokens stolen from a connected chat app to query Salesforce instances across hundreds of customers. No vulnerability was exploited.
A phished BPO contractor's account held permissions to export the entire support ticket dataset in a single query.
After the Okta breach, Cloudflare rotated roughly 5,000 credentials. A single missed service token was enough for attackers to reach the internal Atlassian environment.
A password spray against a legacy test tenant reached a non-production OAuth application that held privileged access to corporate mail. Senior executives' inboxes were read for weeks.
After buying a contractor's credential, attackers used MFA fatigue to log in, then found a PowerShell script with hard-coded admin secrets.
A phishing campaign harvested employee credentials with sufficient access to reach customer data, including downstream services like Signal and Authy.
Attackers used valid OAuth tokens stolen from a connected chat app to query Salesforce instances across hundreds of customers. No vulnerability was exploited.
A phished BPO contractor's account held permissions to export the entire support ticket dataset in a single query.
After the Okta breach, Cloudflare rotated roughly 5,000 credentials. A single missed service token was enough for attackers to reach the internal Atlassian environment.
A password spray against a legacy test tenant reached a non-production OAuth application that held privileged access to corporate mail. Senior executives' inboxes were read for weeks.
After buying a contractor's credential, attackers used MFA fatigue to log in, then found a PowerShell script with hard-coded admin secrets.
A phishing campaign harvested employee credentials with sufficient access to reach customer data, including downstream services like Signal and Authy.
Attackers used valid OAuth tokens stolen from a connected chat app to query Salesforce instances across hundreds of customers. No vulnerability was exploited.
A phished BPO contractor's account held permissions to export the entire support ticket dataset in a single query.
After the Okta breach, Cloudflare rotated roughly 5,000 credentials. A single missed service token was enough for attackers to reach the internal Atlassian environment.
A password spray against a legacy test tenant reached a non-production OAuth application that held privileged access to corporate mail. Senior executives' inboxes were read for weeks.
After buying a contractor's credential, attackers used MFA fatigue to log in, then found a PowerShell script with hard-coded admin secrets.
A phishing campaign harvested employee credentials with sufficient access to reach customer data, including downstream services like Signal and Authy.
Connects to where your identities live
Read-only. Live. No agent to install.